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NEW PROTEST ELITES IN THE POLITICAL
SYSTEM OF WEST-BERLIN: THE ECLIPSE OF
CONSENSUS?

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Introduction

It is one of the established assumptions in modern elite theory that a mixture of both consent and dissent between strategic elites is one of the basic prerequisites to the stability of political regimes and to the efficiency of policy-making. In this theoretical context, consent refers to procedural norms and institutional structures of the polity, whereas dissent refers to divisions on substantive matters of political decision-making. To be sure, in empirical research it may not be easy to define clearly which norms or substantive issues are to be investigated, and sometimes even the differentiation between norms and issues may cause conceptual hazards, - particularly if controversial definitions of the political actors themselves come into play. Also, a particular issue may grow so salient for an elite that the controversy about it becomes fierce, thus disturbing the consent about the "rules of the game".

Yet, as a general working device the consent-cum-dissent assumption has proved to be a powerful stimulus for theoretical and empirical studies on the functions of elites in many countries such as Norway (Highley 1976), the Netherlands (Lijphart, 1968), Canada (Presthus, 1974), Austria (Steinbold, 1974), England (Putnam, 1973), the USA (McClosky, 1960) and others.

In the case of Germany, a variety of writers have used the consent-cum-dissent hypothesis in order to assess the viability and performance of a liberal democratic system, with reference to the Weimar Republic and to the Federal Republic. Authors in the sixties, like Ralf Dahrendorf (1968), have emphasized a peculiar lack of inter-elite conflict which - in combination with a considerable degree of mutual distrust between the leading groups (depicted as a "cartel of the frightful") - was seen as a major

cause not only for a general conservatism and decisional stalemate during the mid-sixties but also as a factor^{that}/may jeopardize the stability of the system.

This picture contrasts sharply with results of elite studies in the seventies. As Rudolf Wildenmann and his associates (Wildenmann, 1971, 1975; Hoffmann-Lange, 1980) could demonstrate on the evidence of successive elite surveys, a broad consensus about fundamental norms of the system exist among political (and also societal) elites in the Federal Republic, while on the other hand there is a considerable amount of inter-elite conflict about major issues, - a mixture which allows a dynamic political process within a stable, i.e. generally accepted institutional context. Elites are thus being able to form variable coalitions and to communicate cooperatively.

While these results may - grosso modo - still hold true in the eighties, we observe recently certain new developments within the political elite formation which causes questions about the prospects for efficient inter-elite cooperation.

Firstly, a new generation with other values and priorities enters into the political arena and gradually also into the political leadership stratum. (Inglehart, 1981) Secondly, members of the steadily growing class of professional academics (which Gouldner has called "Bildungsklasse") with new interests and behaviour patterns are increasingly intruding party and parliamentary elites. (Feist/Liepelt, 1982; Herzog, 1982) Both developments seem to change the structure of political decision-making. Among the political parties particularly the Social Democratic Party is gradually being transformed from a "stratarchic" Volkspartei into a type of "^{forum}~~form~~" with declining party loyalty of the activists and the emergence of intra-party counter-elites.

Thirdly, a variety of new social movements - ecological, peace, women emancipation and others, are increasingly putting pressure on the political process. They also constitute an apparently stable, although still diffuse, electoral basic for new political parties; under different labels like "Grüne" or "Alternative Listen", they already succeeded in entering several local councils and Länder parliaments (Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin, Lower-Saxonia). On the evidence of recent opinion polls, it may be expected that a party of that kind will gather up to 9 % of the vote in general elections and will thus be represented in the next Bundestag. At the moment, these new parties not only advocate particular issues, most of them of a protest or anti-form (anti-nuclear energy, anti-economic growth, anti-military defence etc), but they also call into question the conventional party and parliamentary decision-making procedures. Outside parliament, a kind of rousseauist direct-democracy is being practized, whereas within parliament heavy pressure is exerted on governments while deliberately abstaining from taking over governmental responsibilities. As one of their activists has put it, they are living on two feet, one outside parliament for "standing", the other inside parliament for "playing".

These new developments in the German party system cause a number of questions for empirical elite research:

- How many and of which kind are the areas of inter-elite consent resp. dissent?
- How do major cleavages run, - between the established parties on the one hand and the new political groups on the other, and/or within the parties?

- Are the areas of dissent of such kind that inter-elite cooperation and coalition-building is severely hampered, with the possible effect of blocking political decision-making or even destabilizing the political system?
- What are the social bases of new intra- and inter-elite cleavages, i.e. how durable will they be in the future?

Whereas the last question cannot be answered at the moment, because the relevant data have not been analyzed so far, this paper will try to give an answer to the first three, - however tentatively. The data stem from a research project, directed by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and myself. Its subject is the crisis in the sociopolitical system of West-Berlin, concentrating on several, yet integrated, research dimensions like voting behaviour, participation, attitudes and values, mass-elite linkages and inter-elite conflict. The data bases are, among others, an aggregate analysis of voting behaviour in West-Berlin since 1946, an elite network analysis, a representative population survey and a mail survey among all candidates for the Berlin parliament (Abgeordnetenhaus) and the 12 district assemblies (Bezirksverordnetenversammlung), the two surveys having been conducted shortly before the last Berlin elections on May 10, 1981.

Among the 1911 candidates, 45.8 percent returned the questionnaire, which is a comparatively good response ratio, although it should be added, that the very top politicians have participated less frequently and the response rates from the parties differing a lot. The communist SEW (Sozialistische Einheitspartei West-Berlin) has rejected any cooperation. (Table 1)

In the candidate questionnaire a number of questions about social status, attitudes and values have been taken in, which were also used in the population survey, thus allowing elite-mass comparisons. Similarly, some

questions have been introduced which were used in the recent national elite survey, conducted by Rudolf Wildenmann, Max Kaase and their associates; so a comparative analysis between Berlin and the Federal Republic will be possible.

In this paper, only some of the results will be presented. (Extract from the questionnaire see Appendix A) It is a preliminary analysis, based on a prima facie inspection of some data. The total research project will - hopefully - be finished mid-1983.

Certainly, the situation in Berlin cannot be equated with that in the Federal Republic in general. On the other hand, social and political developments in the metropolitan centres may be considered as being typical or at least indicative for major changes in the national context. In addition, Berlin is particularly interesting because here changes of the party system are apparent and the new social movements are specifically virulent. On their basis, the new political group "Alternative Liste" (AL) succeeded in gathering 7.2 percent of the vote in the last elections, thus being now represented in the Berlin parliament. (Table 2) This election has also made a notable impact on the political regime in so far as the long-standing coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Liberals (FDP), that formed the government since 1963 (with the interruption of a one-party SPD government from 1971 to 1975) lost its majority, giving way for the first time to a (minority) government of the Christian Democrats (CDU).

Government and Pluralism

Starting with an analysis of attitudes towards basic principles of the political order, we find a general consensus between the leadership strata of all Berlin parties. The principle of "alternating government" is commonly approved. (Table 3) Even within those parties which have been in power since several legislative periods in Berlin and also in the Federal Republic (SPD and FDP), a clear majority agrees with the necessity of changing governmental responsibilities from time to time.

Remarkably here, as in others of the following tables, we find a rather large section of around one fourth to one third of the candidates from the "established" parties, who are in a middle position, i.e. neither fully agreeing nor fully disagreeing. This may cause some theoretical reflections. Leaving aside the possibility that these people are actually undecided about the matter (an interpretation which does not seem to be very sensible with respect to political activists standing for election), two different interpretations might be offered: Firstly, that there are more party leaders, particularly within the SPD, who are at least sceptical about the democratic principle of "alternating government" than it would appear under a strict dichotomy between the "yeas" and the "noes". Secondly under a different theoretical perspective, one may propose that the middle position on an attitude scale, like that under scrutiny, is a specific one; these people may hold a mixture of governmental stability (e.g. for long-term planning) and the existence of a strong opposition (that is able to control government effectively and to take over governmental responsibilities) is desirable. With this last mentioned interpretation - which has a long philosophical tradition since Aristotle -, we can understand the groups in the middle position, that are comparatively big in all established parties, as indicative for a well-reflected and consensual option in favour of a stable, although not inflexible, governmental system.

In the same way, attitudes towards public control of government may be interpreted. (Table 4) Clearly, the CDU elite is more authoritatively oriented than those of the other parties. Yet, understanding the interview question strictly as it is formulated, one can argue that the existence of a strong, i.e. effectively working, government is not incompatible with efficient public control of governmental actions, but that in stable democratic polities both are functionally interdependent. Thus, elites of the two major parties are conspicuously consensual in this regard.

With respect to both items, the AL candidates differ a lot. Nearly unanimously they emphasise the necessity of changing government and of the superiority of public control vs. strong government. This reflects their more radical stand towards democratic principles as well as their present situation as a kind of "out-group" in the established power hierarchy.

A similar picture emerges when we look at attitudes towards principles of pluralism. All party elites are overwhelmingly against a political system in which government overrides group interests, - although it should be noted that in this respect the Christian Democratic (CDU and CSU) leadership in the Federal Republic is distinctively more authoritarian than other parties and also than their Berlin branch. (Table 4a)

By contrast, there is less consent between the Christian Democrats and all other parties with respect to the question, whether the "general good" might be decreased by the pressure of interest groups. (Table 5) A majority of CDU leaders are supporting this statement. But again, a rather big group in the middle position of this attitudinal dimension (42 percent in Berlin, and nearly 50 percent at the Federal level), is indicative for the fact that there is no strict opposition against the principle of interest pluralism, although many are sceptical about the possible effects of pressure group influence.

Liberalism and Participation

More diffuse are attitudes of the Berlin leadership strata towards principles of Liberalism. Some issues suggest a very strong inter-elite consent. This refers, for instance, to the issues of "death penalty", which is clearly opposed by all (66 percent in the CDU, and more than 90 percent in the other parties). Any pressure for re-introducing the death penalty into West-German criminal law would have no chance of realization by political leaders. (Table 6)

Consent also exists between all parties about the legitimacy of "compromise" in political decision-making. More than 80 percent among candidates of the established parties, and even a majority of 53 percent among the AL activists, are in favor of politics by compromise.

Noteworthy, a further consent area is found with respect to participation in industry. A majority of all party elites accept the proposition that the chance for individual participation in the regulation of their jobs (Mitbestimmung am Arbeitsplatz) is one of the prerequisites of political democracy, - with a rather strong, at the Federal level even majoritarian, sceptical middle group in the CDU. (Table 7)

But on other items of Liberalism, inter elite consensus is rather fragile. Here the divisions are mostly between the Christian Democrats and all other parties. One of these items is "freedom of opinion and discussion". To be sure, we have to consider the fact, that the interview question is not "limits" to the freedom of opinion may be understood either individually/ formulated unequivocally (in the sense that people are not willing to discuss or modify their personal basic moral conviction) or collectively (i.e. that the freedom of others has to be curbed authoritatively).

Holding this epistemological vagueness in mind, we can cautiously deduce from the data that only among the Christian Democrats there is a substantial group who have a rather restrictive understanding of that liberal principle, while SPD, FDP and AL candidates - in this rank order - are supporting an unlimited freedom of opinion and discussion. (Table 8)

More rigidly drawn are the attitudinal divisions on items of specific forms through which public opinion may be voiced. Asked how strongly they feel about "more say of citizens in political decisions", only about 15 percent of the Christian Democrats, and 19 percent of the Social Democrats, are answering "very important". In contrast, nearly half of the Liberals and all of the "Alternatives" are strongly in favor of more plebiscitarian democracy. (Table 9) Only if we combine those who answer "very important" and "important", a clear majority emerges in all parties supporting the strengthening of citizens' participation in politics. While this principle is generally accepted, the emphasis laid on its promotion varies a lot between the parties, separating particularly the Christian Democrats on the conservative side.

Similarly, attitudes differ with respect to specific legislative actions. Among all interviewees, only within the ranks of the Christian Democrats we find a substantial number of candidates who are strongly in favor of restricting the right of political demonstrations. (Table 10) Yet, from a different perspective, even if we add those who just answer "important", there is no majority (but only 37 percent) in the total CDU elite stratum opting for more restrictive measures. This finding may ring a bell in the heads of some self-confident "strong men" in the upper circles of the Berlin CDU leadership.

More pronounced are Christian Democrats when the issue of the police force is at stake. One quarter strongly favors the strengthening of the police, and a clear majority of about 66 percent (answering "very important" or "important") would back governmental actions for that purpose. It is in this field where the Christian Democrats may be understood as the party of "law and order", - they are very consensual inside and very much separated from the other parties. (Table 11)

Looking at attitude towards "citizen action groups" (Bürgerinitiativen), a different cleavage comes to the fore. Here only the "Alternatives" are (nearly unanimously) approving more influence by these groups, while the established parties are strongly against it. However, this must not mean a general opposition to action groups; since the interview question combines "more influence by action groups" with a reciprocal "less influence by political parties", there is no reason to assume that leaders of established parties voluntarily renounce their power (and responsibilities to their voters) to particular societal interests, - however positively or negatively they may be evaluated as forms of participation in general. (Table 12)

A third type of inter-elite division is exemplified by attitudes concerning the influence of trade unions. Understandably, we find here the "bourgeois" parties (CDU and FDP) on the negative side, while Social Democrats and also AL are fostering more influence by organized labour. Yet, both are by no means unanimous. Even within the over hundred years old "workers party", there is a substantial group of leading activists (about one third) who are at least sceptical about the power of trade unions, - a group that would deserve closer sociological analysis. (Table 13)

Environment, Economy, and Foreign Relations

While we have been finding certain distinct inter-elite cleavages concerning matters of Liberalism and participation, although with different patterns of crisscrossing latent coalitions, there is another picture if we look at areas of economic, environmental and foreign politics.

Being asked whether the system of social welfare (Sozialstaat) should be enhanced, remain as it is now, or be reduced, only the "Alternatives" are strongly in favor of strengthening the "welfare net", whereas even within the Social Democratic leadership cadres no more than about 41 per cent would argue in this direction. (Table 14) There is a sufficient basis of consent, however, in all three established parties agreeing to preserve the present state of the "welfare system". (It may be added that this attitudinal pattern may be very different among party elite at the Federal level, although at the moment there are no comparable data at hand.)

Whether the "protection of the environment" is a consensual issue or not may be a matter of argument. As table 15 shows, only a small majority among the Liberals and the Social Democrats, and of course nearly all "Alternatives", are very strongly environmentally motivated. But summing up those who feel that environmental politics is either "very important" or at least "important", we find a clear majority of 90 percent and more in all parties. Thus, the importance of environmental considerations in politics seems to be generally accepted by all politicians, - the differences between them being more a matter of degree than of kind.

Conversely, the Berlin political class is rather sharply divided between the CDU on the one hand, and SPD, FDP and AL on the other, when we look

at certain crucial problems of economic and foreign politics. (Tables 16,17) Asked about their stand towards "economic growth" and "nuclear energy", we find a positive majority only in the CDU, with all other party elites being sceptical or adversary. Yet the "hard core" of strong opponents is much smaller in the SPD and FDP than among the "Alternative" candidates. On both issues, therefore, the main division is clearly separating the Christian Democrats from all other parties, but there seems to exist a second, minor cleavage between the two established parties (SPD, FDP) and the "Alternatives", who hold a particularly strong position in both policy areas.

Additionally, because of the present salience of the nuclear issue, a brief look at the opinions of the electorate may be of interest. As table 18 shows, the voters of the Christian Democrats are conspicuously more reluctant in supporting nuclear energy than their party. Conversely, there are more proponents of nuclear energy among the Social-Democratic and also "Alternative" voters than among their parties' leaders. Thus, dissent on this issue is more accentuated by the elites than it is in the electorates.

On foreign policy issues, the Anti-Communist consens, which was characteristic for Berlin in the fifties and sixties, seems to be broken up, - at least at the political elite level. Looking at the attitudes towards "World Communism" (Table 19), we find only the Christian Democratic candidates understanding "World Communism" as the most important threat to Western democracies, and their leadership stratum is nearly unanimous on this issue. Among all items analyzed so far, "Anti-Communism" ist the issue where Christian Democratic inter-elite consensus is most pronounced, being

also roughly the same in West-Berlin and at the Federal level.

All other parties are on an adversary stand, with the Social Democrats and the Liberals internally rather divided and the "Alternatives" very unanimous and on the extreme position.

This corresponds to attitudes towards foreign policy strategies. Only a majority of CDU candidates advocate a "policy of military strength", i.e. a "strong NATO", while this is strongly opposed by all other parties. (Table 20)

It should be added, however, that under the premise of an East-West arms reduction, more than 80 percent of CDU, SPD, and FDP candidates are pro-NATO, while only about a quarter of the Social Democrats and of the Liberals are favoring the dissolution of NATO (and the Warsaw Treaty Organization). So we find two cleavages in the total political elite stratum in Berlin: One that separates sharply the CDU from all other parties, referring to a "policy of military strength"; the other dividing the established parties from the AL, with respect to the preservation/dissolution of the Western military alliance.

Again, an elite-mass comparison reveals distinctively different patterns. Whereas on the Christian Democratic side, candidates and their voters have roughly similar preferences, notable incongruencies are apparent on the side of the other parties; in contrast to their candidates, about one third of the SPD and of the FDP voters are supporting a "strong NATO", while conversely there are less AL voters favoring a dissolution of the Western and Eastern military alliances than AL candidates. In this crucial area, political dissent is more marked at the elite level than among the population at large. (Table 21)

Inter-Elite Consent and Dissent Areas: A Summary

Summarizing the foregoing analysis, the following table gives a rough overview about inter-elite consent and dissent.

AREAS OF INTER-ELITE CONSENT AND DISSENT

(1) Inter-elite consent

- Alternating government
- Public control of government
- Legitimacy of interest groups
- Compromise in politics
- Individual participation at the work place (as a prerequisite for democracy)
- Death penalty
- Protection of the environment

(2) Dissent between established parties (CDU, SPD, FDP) vs. AL

- More influence by action groups, less by political parties
- Welfare state
- Dissolution of NATO (and Warsaw Treaty Organization) ¹

(3) Dissent between "bourgeois" parties (CDU, FDP) vs. "left-wing" parties (SPD, AL)

- More influence by labour unions

(4) Dissent between CDU vs. all others (SPD, FDP, AL)

- Interests as threat to "common good"
- Limits to freedom of opinion
- More say for people in political decisions
- Limits to the right for demonstrations
- Strengthening of policy force
- Politics of economic growth
- Nuclear energy
- Anti-Communism
- Politics of military strength ¹

1) Combined in one interview question

By inspecting the issues, three things emerge: Firstly, there is a wide spread consensus between all Berlin parties about fundamentals of government. This includes also the acceptance of compromise in political decision-making, the opposition against re-introducing the death penalty, the value of ecological considerations, and a participatory non-authoritative employer-employee relationship. On the other hand, there are many inter-elite conflict areas not only on substantive - and indeed salient - issues but also on matters of Liberalism and political participation.

Secondly, the traditional antagonism between the "bourgeois" parties and the "Socialists" does not seem to constitute a major cleavage any longer. Nor do we find most conflicts as separating the established parties from the emerging new party of the "Alternative movement", - although the differences between them may be rather distinct in some issue areas. Instead, the dividing line of dissent on a variety of issues concerning substantive policy matters and procedural norms of Liberalism runs between the Christian Democrats on the one hand and the three other parties (SPD, FDP, AL) on the other. These conflict areas would need thorough sociological analysis.

Thirdly, from the inspection of the data so far presented here, it does not appear that the eclipse of inter-elite consensus in Berlin may destabilize the political system. Fundamental norms for democratic government are shared by all party elites. Yet, there are certain salient policy issues, like economic growth, nuclear energy, and international politics (e.g. military strength, NATO), where inter-elite dissent has obviously deepened in recent years. This may put severe strains on the political process. Inter-elite cooperation and coalition building in parliament may be severely hampered. On certain basic policy issues, the Christian Democrats (with their relative

majority in parliament) and the new party of the "Alternatives" (with around 7 percent of the vote) are both internally quite consensual and externally extremely far apart, - with the Social Democrats and the Liberals drifting away from the former consensus of the established parties. Thus, in spatial terms, the middle position in the total political spectrum has become weakened, with the chances of stable majority formation in parliament being reduced.

Table 1: The Berlin Elite Sample

	Candidates for Election 1981	Candidates Interviewed N	%
Total	1911	875	45.8
CDU	653	262	40.1
SPD	652	384	58.9
FDP	210	120	58.0
AL	199	86	43.2
others	197	22	12.0
Abgeordneten- haus	718	314	43.7
Bezirksver- ordnetenver- sammlung	1193	561	47.0
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Table 2: Election Results for Berlin Parliament (Abgeordnetenhaus)

	1979 (3.March)	1981 (10.May)
Voting Turnout (%)	85.4	85.3
Voters (%)		
CDU	44.4	47.9
SPD	42.7	38.4
FDP	8.1	5.6
AL	3.7	7.2
SEW	1.1	0.7
others	0.1	0.3
Seats (N)		
CDU	63	65
SPD	61	51
FDP	11	7
AL	-	9
SEW	-	-
others	-	-
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Table 3 : Stability of government more important than chance for changing governmental majorities (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Agree	18	27	23	1
Middle	29	35	26	14
Disagree	53	38	51	85
Positive all (agreeing)	33	45	37	6
Negative all (disagreeing)	67	55	63	94
N	256	378	117	81
\bar{x}	-.96	-.30	-.71	- 2.4
Std	2.1	2.2	2.2	1.1

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Table 4 : Strong government more important than public control of government (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Agree	33	18	14	2
Middle	35	37	23	1
Disagree	32	45	63	97
Positive all (agreeing)	57	39	24	2
Negative all (disagreeing)	43	61	76	98
N	253	378	116	84
\bar{x}	.18	-.69	- 1.13	-2.73
Std	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.0

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Table 4a: Strong political leadership necessary for overriding group interests (%)

	CDU Berlin FRG		SPD Berlin FRG		FDP Berlin FRG		AL Berlin
Agree	23	35	7	11	5	16	-
Middle	27	33	14	34	13	32	1
Disagree	50	32	79	55	82	52	99
Positive all (agreeing)	39	55	15	28	11	24	1
Negative all (disagreeing)	61	45	85	72	89	76	99
N	256	121	380	122	118	25	83
\bar{x}	-.71	.03	-2.1	-1.0	-2.3	-.86	-2.9
StD	2.3	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	.46

Table 5 : Demands by interest groups decrease "general good" (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Agree	30	14	12	2
Middle	42	25	32	5
Disagree	28	61	56	93
Positive all (agreeing)	60	27	25	2
Negative all (disagreeing)	40	73	75	98
N	256	380	119	82
\bar{x}	.25	-1.3	-1.3	-2.7
StD	2.1	2.0	1.9	0.9

Table 6 : Re-introduction of death penalty (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Agree	19	6	4	-
Middle	24	7	8	1
Disagree	57	87	88	99
Positive all (agreeing)	34	11	8	-
Negative all (disagreeing)	66	89	92	100
N	256	382	119	84
\bar{x}	-1.1	-2.4	-2.5	-3.0
StD	2.3	1.5	1.4	0.2

Table 7 : Participation at work necessary for democracy (%)

	CDU		SPD		FDP		AL
	Berlin	FRG	Berlin	FRG	Berlin	FRG	Berlin
Agree	2	21	83	91	70	48	93
Middle	49	64	16	7	26	36	7
Disagree	19	15	1	2	4	16	-
Positive all (agreeing)	66	61	96	97	87	76	99
Negative all (disagreeing)	34	39	4	3	13	24	1
N	256	122	381	123	118	25	84
\bar{x}	.57	.15	2.4	2.0	1.7	.66	2.7
StD	1.9	1.2	1.1	.89	1.4	1.5	.68

Table 8 : Limits to freedom of opinion (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Agree	53	24	20	4
Middle	28	26	21	18
Disagree	19	50	59	78
Positive all (agreeing)	74	44	29	12
Negative all (disagreeing)	26	56	71	88
N	255	376	118	83
\bar{x}	1.0	-.79	-1.1	-2.1
StD	2.1	2.2	2.3	1.4

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Table 9 : More say of citizens in political decisions (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Very important	15 > 64	29 > 80	47 > 93	94 > 99
Important	49	51	46	5
Not so important	30	16	6	-
Unimportant	2	2	-	1
Against	4	2	1	-
N	248	372	116	83

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Table 10 : Restriction for right of demonstration (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Very important	15	2	-	-
Important	23	5	2	-
Not so important	27	10	11	-
Unimportant	8	8	8	-
Against	27	75	79	100
N	246	369	114	82

Table 11 : Strengthening police (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Very important	25	6	6	-
Important	41	17	9	-
Not so important	26	38	30	2
Unimportant	3	10	13	5
Against	5	29	42	93
N	246	363	110	83

Table 12 : More influence by action groups (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Very important	0	1	4	55
Important	4	9	14	36
Not so important	22	31	34	8
Unimportant	13	10	11	1
Against	61	49	37	-
N	248	363	111	84

Table 13 : More influence by labour unions (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Very important	1 > 5	12 > 59	1 > 4	19 > 55
Important	4 > 5	47 > 59	3 > 4	36 > 55
Not so important	27	32	34	35
Unimportant	10	1	11	5
Against	58	8	51	5
N	247	361	114	80

Table 14: Social welfare system (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Strengthening	7	41	17	75
Keeping as it is	57	53	60	21
More individual self-care	36	6	23	4
N	259	379	120	79

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Table 15: Environmental considerations necessary (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Very important	30	51	55	91
Important	59	43	41	9
Not so important	10	6	3	-
Unimportant	-	0	-	-
Against	1	-	1	-
N	249	377	117	85

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Table 16 : Economic growth (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Very important	26	10	9	1
Important	48	35	28	6
Not so important	22	41	41	19
Unimportant	2	5	8	18
Against	2	9	14	56
	4	14	22	74
N	242	370	115	80

Table 17 : Nuclear energy (attitudes of candidates)(%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Very important	47	12	12	-
Important	44	29	27	14
Not so important	7	22	26	14
Unimportant	0	6	3	-
Against	2	31	32	72
		37	35	
N	249	366	113	83

Table 18 : Nuclear energy (attitudes of voters) (%)

	V o t e r s o f :			
	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Very important	29	16	13	3
Important	48	37	32	11
Not so important	15	31	29	23
Unimportant	2	6	10	17
Against	6	10	16	46
N	348	261	49	81

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Table 19: World Communism as threat to Western democracies (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Agree	81	22	21	-
Middle	15	34	33	5
Disagree	4	44	46	95
Positive all (agreeing)	93	38	40	1
Negative all (disagreeing)	7	62	60	99
N	256	381	119	82
\bar{x}	2.2	-.64	-.62	-2.7
Std	1.3	2.2	2.2	.7

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Table 20: Attitudes toward NATO (candidates) (%)

	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Strong NATO	58	6	6	-
Arms reduction (by NATO and Warsaw Treaty Org.)	38	67	71	2
Dissolution of NATO and Warsaw Treaty Org.	4	27	23	98
N	258	380	119	86

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Table 21: Attitudes toward NATO (voters) (%)

	V o t e r s o f :			
	CDU	SPD	FDP	AL
Strong NATO	60	33	34	5
Arms reduction	27	42	42	23
Dissolution of NATO and Warsaw Treaty Org.	11	23	24	71
Don't know	2	2	0	1
N	348	261	49	81

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Interview question

English version

Table 3 Stabilität und Kontinuität der politischen Führung sind für die Bundesrepublik wichtiger als eine möglichst hohe Chance der Ablösung einer Regierungs-
partei durch die Opposition.

Stability of government more important than chance for changing governmental majorities.

Table 4 In der Bundesrepublik kommt es weniger auf eine wirksame öffentliche Kontrolle der Regierung an, als vielmehr darauf, daß es überhaupt eine starke Regierung gibt.

"Strong" government more important than public control of government.

Table 4a Demokratie ist auf die Dauer in Deutschland nur möglich, wenn sich eine starke politische Führung über alle Gruppeninteressen hinwegsetzt.

Strong political leadership necessary for overriding group interests.

Table 5 Das Gemeinwohl in der Bundesrepublik und die Interessen des ganzen Volkes werden grundsätzlich durch die ständigen Forderungen und Auseinandersetzungen der Interessengruppen gefährdet.

Demands by interest groups decrease "general good".

Table 6 Vieles spricht dafür, für bestimmte Verbrechen die Todesstrafe auch in der Bundesrepublik einzuführen.

Re-introduction of death penalty.

Table 7 Demokratie kann nur verwirklicht werden, wenn der Einzelne die Chance hat, sich nicht nur an den allgemeinen Wahlen zu beteiligen, sondern auch am Arbeitsplatz weitgehend mitzubestimmen.

Participation at work necessary for democracy

Table 8 Meinungs- und Diskussionsfreiheit müssen dort ihre Grenze haben, wo elementare moralische Überzeugungen und sittliche Grundwerte berührt werden.

Limits to freedom of opinion.

Table 19 Die größte Gefahr für die westlichen Demokratien ist nach wie vor der aggressive Weltkommunismus, den nur mit Härte begegnet werden kann.

World Communism as threat to Western democracies.

Answer categories for these questions:

Agree totally	+ 3	+ 2	+ 1	-1	-2	-3	Disagree totally
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APPENDIX A (cont'd)

Table 9	Die Bürger sollten mehr Mitsprache bei politischen Entscheidungen haben.	More say of citizens in political decisions.
Table 10	Das Demonstrationsrecht sollte eingeschränkt werden.	Restriction for right of demonstration.
Table 11	Die staatlichen Ordnungskräfte sollten weiter ausgebaut werden, um Sicherheit und Ordnung zu gewährleisten.	Strengthening police.
Table 12	Parteien sollten weniger Einfluß haben, Bürgerinitiativen dagegen mehr.	More influence by action groups.
Table 13	Die Gewerkschaften sollten in unserer Gesellschaft mehr Einfluß haben.	More influence by labour unions.
Table 15	Bei allen wirtschaftlichen und politischen Entscheidungen muß berücksichtigt werden, ob sie nicht eine Gefahr für die Natur und unsere Umwelt sind.	Environmental considerations necessary.
Table 16	Der technische Fortschritt und das wirtschaftliche Wachstum sollten unbedingt weitergehen.	Economic growth.
Table 17/18	Die Energieversorgung sollte auch durch Nutzung der Atomkraft gesichert werden.	Nuclear energy.

Answer categories for these questions: Very important

Important

Not so important

Totally unimportant

I am against it

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